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Consider the following scenario: an individual walking at night
in a private, secure parking lot notices a key dangling from a parked
car's ignition. He glances one way, and then looks the other way,
seeing no one.
He is alone with himself and with his moral
inclination, which prevents him from stealing away with the car.
Despite the ease with which he could take this car, our society
overwhelmingly would decry such an act as criminal and worthy of
strict penalty. No moral and ethical society could condone such
disrespectful, irresponsible behavior. So, why is the theft of a musical
recording any less offensive? The music industry rightfully owns
musical content, yet the stigma attached to an individual's stealing a
car does not carry the same gravitas as an individual's exploitative
music downloading. Why are the moral and ethical impulses that
restrain an individual from stealing a car numb when the individual
has the opportunity to access a pirated music product?

J.D. Candidate, George Mason University School of Law, 2007.
B.A,
Washington & Lee University, 2000. My gratitude to Professor Terence Ross, Esq. and
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America's Founders recognized value in the arts and had
respect for artists: Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution empowers Congress "to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."1 Unfortunately, modern society's corrosive sense of
entitlement to pirated music threatens to destroy the fundamental
protection that artists and their music industry patrons need in order
to continue to produce transcendent works.
Such an attitude
overlooks the primacy of artistic content: the devices that make music
transportable and accessible would be of insignificant use without the
sacrifices of those in the music industry. To sustain an enriching
exchange between artist and audience, lawmakers and the judiciary
must promote and enforce a stable legal framework that protects basic
property rights. Without secure laws that clearly protect the interests
of the artist and those sacrificing financially on his behalf, innovation
and growth will be eviscerated. Why should an artist and his patron
invest time, energy, emotion, and money into an endeavor when they
cannot be confident that they will be protected from those exploiting
the artist's work?
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Sony Corporationof
America v. Universal City Studios 2 introduced the doctrine that a
manufacturer and distributor of a product cannot be held liable for the
product's infringing uses as long as the product is capable of
noncommercial, "substantial, non-infringing uses."3 This concept,
having never been given a quantified description adequately
establishing the point of balance between protection and commerce,
failed to anticipate the ways in which technology would evolve. Law
and economics principles illuminate the importance of eliminating
Sony's "substantial non-infringing use" doctrine to securely preclude
the exploitation of copyrighted music. 4 Unfortunately, since the Sony
decision, the Supreme Court has deviated from a strict interpretation
of the Copyright Act, paving the way for technology predators to
operate and flourish at the expense of the artist.5 The "substantial

1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 8. Congress limits the grant of these "monopoly
privileges" to motivate creative activity and to secure fair return for artists' labors, but,
through the limits of this clause, Congress also encourages creativity for the general public
good.
2.
Sony Corp. of Am.v.Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
3.
Id. at 418.
4.
See infra Part II.
5.
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 U.S. 2764
(2005) (demonstrating the Supreme Court's willingness to adopt into copyright law
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non-infringing use" doctrine allows these predators to shield
themselves from sanction. Until our legal system adequately quashes
stealing, incentives for creative, artistic expression will continue to
erode.
I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. The "Betamax"Case: Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City
Studios
At issue in the Sony decision was whether Sony's selling of
home video tape recorders ("VTRs") to the general public violated
Universal's copyrights to television programs broadcast on public
airwaves, and whether the Betamax VTR was capable of
commercially-significant non-infringing uses. 6 Universal sued Sony
for copyright infringement, alleging that, because Sony's consumers
used VTRs to record Universal's copyrighted works, Sony was liable
for the copyright infringement allegedly committed by those
consumers. 7 Ultimately, the Court's rationale borrowed from patent
law's traditional "staple article of commerce" doctrine, which states
that distribution of a component of a patented device will not violate
the patent if the device is suitable for use in other ways.,
The Sony majority held that Sony's VTRs did not infringe on
Universal's exclusive copyrights of its broadcasts. 9
The Court
reasoned that authorized private home "time-shifting" was a fair use
under Section 107 of the Copyright Act since "time-shifting" merely
enables a viewer to see a work that he had been invited to witness in
its entirety free of charge at another time. 10 More significantly, the
concepts not codified in the Copyright Act when the Court liberally borrowed from patent

law the "inducement of infringement" doctrine).
6.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 420, 442.
7.
Id. at 417.
8.
35 U.S.C.A. § 271(c) (2003).
9.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 418.
10.
Pursuant to Section 107 of the Copyright Act, the following factors are to be
considered in determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use (an affirmative defense):
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.

512

VANDERBILTJ OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH.LAW

[Vol. 9:3:509

Court recognized that a company making or marketing a product
cannot be held liable for the infringing uses of the product as long as
the product is capable of noncommercial, "substantial, non-infringing
uses.""1

A challenge to the "substantial non-infringing use" doctrine
requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that either (1) the
product's particular use is harmful or that it likely will lead to harm,
or (2) if the product should become widespread, it would adversely
affect the copyrighted works' potential market. 12 If the intended use
of the product is for commercial gain, the likelihood of future harm
may be presumed; if the use is for a noncommercial purpose, the
likelihood must be demonstrated.13
Universal failed to provide
evidence that people were giving or selling tapes to others and offered
no evidence of decreased television viewing by Betamax owners.1 4
Further, Universal failed to show that "time-shifting" had impaired
the commercial value of their copyrights or had created any likelihood
of future harm, significantly bolstering the argument that VTRs were
'15
capable of "substantial, non-infringing uses.
Sony's "substantial non-infringing use" doctrine opened a wide
door enabling technology innovators with misguided ambitions to
enter the marketplace and threaten to cannibalize the music industry.
Instead of bowing to concerns about curtailing motivation for
technological innovation, the Court's concern should have focused on
the investment, vision, and dedication of artists and music labels,
without whom artistic musical content does not exist.
B. Peer-to-PeerNetworks: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster,16 the Supreme
Court passed up an important opportunity to revisit Sony's
"substantial non-infringing use" doctrine. Instead, the Court-again

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
11.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 418.
12.
Id. at 451.

13.

Id..

14.
Id. at 424. This is not the case in the music industry, where empirical studies
confirm that services like Grokster's and Streamcast's have caused a steep decline in music
sales. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480, 2004 WL 2289200) (citing SIMON DYSON,
INFORMA MEDIA GROUP REPORT, MUSIC ON THE INTERNET 25 (4th ed. 2003) (estimating
losses at $700 million to several billion dollars annually)).
15.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
16.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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operating outside of the Copyright Act-opted to use another patent
law rationale to craft yet another doctrine of copyright infringement,
which the Court called "inducement."17 At issue in Grokster was the
tension between the competing values of supporting creativity through
copyright protection and promoting technological innovation by
limiting infringement liability.18
Grokster and Streamcast were
distributors of free software products that allowed computer users to
share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. 19 In the case, a
group of copyright holders sued Grokster and Streamcast for their
users' copyright infringement. 20 Specifically, the complaint alleged
that the companies knowingly and intentionally distributed their
software, thereby enabling users to illegally reproduce and distribute
1
copyrighted works.2
The Court held that one who distributes a device with the
objective of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as demonstrated
by "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement," is liable for the resulting infringing acts by third
22
parties using the device, regardless of the device's lawful uses.
"[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent [to
promote infringement]. '"23 Further, where evidence goes beyond a
product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to
infringing uses and shows statements or actions directed to promoting
24
infringement, Sony's "staple-article rule" will not preclude liability.
Several tangible factors led to the Court's finding against
Grokster and Streamcast. First, each company aimed to satisfy a
known source of demand for copyright infringement: the market
comprising the users of the legally discredited Napster. 25 Next,
neither provider attempted to deliver filtering tools or other
mechanisms to diminish the activity of copyright infringers using

17.
Id. at 935-36.
18.
Id. at 928-29.
19.
Id. at 919-20.
20.
Id. at 920-21.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at 919.
23.
Id. at 935.
24.
Id. The Court stated:
MGM's evidence gives reason to think that the vast majority of users' downloads
are acts of infringement, and because well over 100 million copies of the software
in question are known to have been downloaded, and billions of files are shared
across the FastTrack and Gnutella networks each month, the probable scope of
copyright infringement is staggering.
Id. at 923.
25.
Id. at 923-24.
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their software. 26 Also, the technology providers made money by
selling advertising space and then directing ads to the computers
employing their software. 27 The more the companies' software was
used, the more ads were sent out, and the greater the advertising
revenue. 28
As a result, the technology providers' commercial
enterprise turned on high-volume use of infringing content, which the
Court considered when assessing the circumstances since nothing in
Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent to promote
29
infringement.
Despite this seeming win for the music industry against
technology predators, the Court myopically refused to overturn Sony's
"substantial non-infringing use" doctrine, or to appropriately
discourage technology that continues to produce a long list of new and
unchecked copying devices that infringe music industry copyrights.
Instead, the Court has left unanswered disparate interpretations of
30
Sony that still question the usefulness and clarity of this doctrine.
II. THE MUSIC INDUSTRY'S OWN "DEAD CAPITAL"
Among the major questions at the nexus of law and economics
31
queries is how private property law affects economic development.
Analogizing to the music industry, an individual may question how
the Supreme Court's failure to unconditionally protect an artist's
copyrights affects artistic risk, creative innovation, and resultantly,
the growth of the industry. Grokster kept alive such nebulous terms
from Sony as "substantial" and "commercially significant," thereby
perpetuating the danger of continued violative behavior against the

26.
Id. at 926-27.
27.
Id. at 926.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. at 935, 926-27.
30.
There is no consensus on when Sony precludes liability, with interpretations
ranging from "not if there is actual knowledge or willful blindness" or "not if there are
substantial infringing uses and available means to prevent them" or "when the principal of
primary use if non-infringing" to "when there is a reasonable possibility of substantial noninfringing uses" or "when a product is merely capable of substantial non-infringing uses" or
"whether there was an intentional facilitation of infringement, including design decisions"
or "whether conduct other than the design encouraged infringement." Jonathan Band, The
Grokster Scorecard, http://www.eff.org/IP/P2PfMGM_vGrokster/summary.pdf. (last visited
Apr. 4, 2007) (compiling in chart form the different standards put forward by the parties
and various amicus briefs).
31.
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 157 (2000).
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music industry's copyrights. 32
Consequently, this uncertainty
threatens to paralyze musical innovation and development.
According to economist Hernando de Soto, secure and stable
property rights drive substantive, sustainable economic growth. 33 De
Soto's basic premise is that a nation cannot develop economically
without societal respect for property rights. 34 He observes that while
the poor in developing countries already own land and houses, this
"capital" is "dead capital" because the undefined property is not
officially recognized. 35 Because the properties are not recorded
anywhere and there is no clear title for the land or house, the property
value cannot be borrowed against. 36 Such property is not fungible,
and thus can serve only its most basic usage.3 7 Creating certainty
over this property would free this "dead capital" to become an engine
for growth, as such property functions as capital in rich countries. 38
Sony does not state precisely how much non-infringing use a
defendant must show to escape liability, just as it alternately does not
quantify how much infringing use a product must have for its
manufacturer and distributor to be liable for copyright infringement.
Ill-specified and ill-defined copyright protection leads to wasted
artistic capital, since Sony's "substantial non-infringing use" doctrine
fails to adequately protect the music industry's investments from
individuals' access to recordings that they do not own. Just as
insecure property rights lead to waste and unrealized growth because
of uncertain land titles, the Court's failure to unconditionally protect
copyrights threatens the music industry, since it creates disincentives
for the industry to invest in creating new and innovative sounds,
technologies, and other breakthroughs. Moreover, failed copyright
protection perpetuates the existence of a black market for free music
files available to the masses.
While de Soto's legal rationale about incentives and
disincentives to growth is universally applicable, there exist, of course,
key distinctions between his concern for third world economies and
the concerns of those in the music industry; if anything, though, such
distinctions only strengthen the music industry's argument against
the "substantial non-infringing use" doctrine. Whereas de Soto's poor
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
poor of the

Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932-33.
See DE SOTO, supra note 31, at 159.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Third

32.
6.
35. The "total value of the real estate held but not legally owned by the
World and former communist nations is at least $9.3 trillion." Id.
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have no way of turning their untitled land into development and

growth because they do not have legitimate and effective systems of
property rights, the Copyright Act provides clear direction for
protecting copyrighted products and allotting asset ownership. 39
Moreover, the music industry owns clear legal title to creative
products and thus is entitled to innovate without the risk of others'
court-sanctioned stealing of its product.
Eliminating Sony's "substantial non-infringing use" doctrine
brings the security and certainty needed to fully develop the music
industry, leaving nothing as wasted potential or "dead capital." The
Court should view copyright infringement through de Soto's lens
linking secure legal protection with development. The Court must
recognize the importance of strictly applying the Copyright Act's plain
language to protect unconditionally the rights of artists and those
funding artistic growth. Secure legal protection encourages greater
creative risks benefiting all touched by the music industry.
III. CONCLUSION

Development, or an environment that nurtures development,
results from a society that respects legitimately-acquired property.
This environment can be reached by voluntarily restraining
aggression against others' property or by using force to defend
legitimately-acquired property. In case others do not engage in
voluntary restraint, society needs to actively defend property against
aggressors.
Without protection of private property, predators,
whether private or state, can freely exploit one's rightful possession
and unfettered use of his creation.
Sony's "substantial non-infringing use" doctrine creates "dead
capital" in the music industry because the Court has failed to
assuredly protect the industry's investment, which leads to more riskaverse behavior and lost innovation. Moreover, one may measure the
music industry's "dead capital" by the corrosive effects of a black
market for free files-lost profits that could have been recycled into the
business. With money earmarked for legal protection of its legitimate
copyrights, the music industry has less capital for business
development.
The administration of copyright law manages the trade-off
between the benefits derived from encouraging the creation of works

39.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106. The Copyright Act unequivocally grants copyright holder
exclusive rights to use and to authorize the use of his work in five qualified ways, including
reproduction of the copyrighted work in copies. Id. § 106.
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and artistic protection and the cost of restricting access. 40 Copyright
law cannot work without a strong legal system that strictly reads the
rights granted to those seeking the law's protection and against those
seeking to find creative ways to avert the law's protections. Ironically,
certain technology providers want protection against others'
infringement on their technological creations, but they accept that
their businesses base themselves on eroding the value of another's
hard work and innovation. Sony allows technology companies to hide
behind the "substantial non-infringing use" doctrine. This shield not
only erodes the value of sound recordings and musical compositions,
but it also diminishes respect for the very foundation of copyright law
in the digital age.
Sony betrays the public good in failing to
adequately protect artists and their music industry patrons. It is time
that the Court firmly reevaluate copyright infringement doctrine in
the post-Sony marketplace.

40.
(1984).

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 n.12

